Does globalization lead to a rat race of national labor-market institutions? by Stauvermann Peter J.
 
 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 1, pp. 73-87 
Received: 13 September 2011; Accepted: 22 May 2012. 
 
UDC 339.9:331.5
DOI: 10.2298/PAN1301073S
Original scientific paper
 
 
Peter J.  
Stauvermann 
 
Department of Economics,  
Changwon National University,  
South Korea 
 
 pstauvermann@t-online.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I thank Carlie Geerdink, Ronald Kumar, 
Sereyvath Ky, the editor and two 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
critics and suggestions. All remaining 
errors are mine. Additionally, this 
research was supported by the 
Research Funds of the Changwon 
National University. 
Does Globalization Lead to a Rat 
Race of National Labor-Market 
Institutions? 
 
Summary: Since just around 30 years we observe that the labor’s share of the
national income decreases in most countries. In this paper, we introduce an
endogenous overlapping generation growth model with an institutional setting 
of the labor market to show that the changes of the labor-market institutions are 
one main reason for the decrease of the labor’s share. These changes are
mainly caused by the increasing globalization resulting in open capital markets
and as a consequence in a competition between countries with respect to the
labor-market institutions. In the long run, all will suffer. The only ways to stop
this rat race are capital controls or international agreements on the labor-
market institutions.
Key words: Endogenous growth, Open economies, Labor’s share, Labor mar-
ket institutions. 
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In this paper, we investigate whether the competition between countries regarding to 
attract mobile capital, is a way to enhance the economic welfare in all involved coun-
tries in the long run, as it is promised by “globalists” (Tadija Tadić 2006a). Tadić 
(2006a, b) gives an overview about the different views about globalization. The 
“skeptics”, as Tadić (2006b) calls them, argue that the increasing international com-
petition does not enhance the welfare of the average citizens and in fact, harms the 
working class and the poor people worldwide. The skeptics claim that the process of 
globalization is only in favor of capital owners and rich people on the back of high 
competition resulting in slashing the social standards of employees and the rights of 
labor unions, and compromising national economic and social security policy. In 
principle, the critical argument is that it is impossible to realize gains from trade for 
all societal groups if unfair competition combined with missing international labor 
and social security standards exists.  
Standard theory of trade like the Heckscher-Ohlin theory or Ricardo theory 
tells us that the opening of markets is welfare enhancing for all involved economies, 
but not necessarily for all members of them. Especially since the mid of the 1970s we 
observe that the income share of labor is decreasing in most countries. Using the 
numbers from the national accounts; in the time between 1995 and 2008, the labor 
income share in Germany declined from 72% to 65%. Even in countries like India 
the labor income share decreased from 44.9% in 1995 to 35.9% in 2005. A huge 
amount of literature confirms this view, for example, Olivier Blanchard (1997), and 
Anne E. Harrison (2002). However, the explanations for the decrease are mainly  
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based on neoclassical arguments, like changes of the factor productivity, changes of 
the capital-labor ratio, and changes of the elasticity of labor demand.  
Though, Harrison and Margaret McMillian (2006), Harrison and Edward E. 
Leamer (1997) or Samuel Bentolila and Gilles Saint Paul (2003) pointed out that the 
bargaining power of workers plays a crucial role in explaining the decline of the la-
bor’s income share, where this argument does not play a role in neoclassical models. 
Here we offer a new approach to incorporate this important aspect in an endogenous 
growth model. Therefore, we concentrate on the bargaining power of labor and its 
influence on the labor’s income share. Especially, in the last 30-40 years the bargain-
ing power of labor unions has decreased sharply, which was mainly caused by 
changes of the labor-market institutions. For example, this happened in Great Britain 
under the Thatcher government, in the USA under the Reagan government or in 
Germany under the Schröder government. Because of the lower bargaining power of 
labor unions, the incentive for workers to join a union has also decreased, which of 
course caused a further decrease of the bargaining power of labor unions. Similar 
policy measures were applied more or less in all developed countries.  
Particularly, we analyze the effects of a transition from a closed economy to 
an economy with open capital markets and the influence of the opening on the insti-
tutional settings of a country. The approach is, in some way related to Willem H. 
Buiter (1981), who uses Peter A. Diamond’s (1965) standard overlapping generations 
(OLG) model in combination with a neoclassical production function. He analyzes 
international borrowing and lending. In his model, different time preference rates of 
individuals are responsible for differences between countries. The differences in our 
analysis are caused by different national labor-market institutions. We show that in-
ternational competition and open capital markets lead to a rat race to attract capital 
from abroad, as long as international cooperation does not take place.   
In the first section, we introduce an OLG-model with a Leontief production 
function in a closed economy. In the second section, we investigate what happens if 
the country opens its capital market. This is followed by an analysis of the transition 
from autarky to an open world capital market for the case of a small country and the 
case of two countries.  
 
1. The Model 
 
On the consumer side, we use an OLG approach introduced by Paul A. Samuelson 
(1958) and Diamond (1965). We use this approach, because otherwise we could not 
so easily identify the capital owners and workers. Additionally, the well-known al-
ternative Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model is nothing else than an OLG-model with 
perfect intergenerational altruism. Implicitly, we can interpret the savings in the OLG 
model as voluntary contributions to a capital funded pension system.  
The distribution of income is thus a distribution of national income between 
workers and pension funds, which are the shareholders of the firms. In so far an OLG 
model without altruism seems to be more appropriate to model the real world than a 
model with perfect intergenerational altruism.   
We assume a twice continuously differentiable, homothetic, strictly quasi-
concave utility function with the usual characteristics:    
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   =     
 ,     
   ,  (1)
 
where   
  is the consumption in the first life period of an individual born in period t 
and     
   is the consumption in the second life period of an individual born in period 
t. This representative consumer lives two periods. After determining the labor time, 
she offers it inelastically and receives a wage income. In the second period of life, 
she retires and consumes her savings and interest income. We calculate the optimal 
labor time below. After solving the time allocation problem the intertemporal budget 
restriction is given by: 
 
  
  +
    
 
      
=   ,     (2)
 
where    is the wage income and      the interest rate. However, besides the in-
tertemporal allocation problem, the individual has as well to solve a time allocation 
problem in period one. By assumption, leisure plays no role in this model, but the 
individual has to solve a trade-off between working time and educational time, where 
the total time is normalized to one. The acquired knowledge enhances immediately 
the labor productivity of the individual and hence the wage income. The wage in-
come depends on the working time and the acquired human capital of an individual.  
 
   =    ℎ       =       1−       .    (3)
 
The variable      is the wage rate per effective labor unit, which is given by the 
market,    represents the working time, and (4) represents the human capital. The 
amount of effective labor units equals ℎ      . 
 
ℎ     =    1−      .  (4)
 
The human capital depends on the duration of education 1−   , the available 
stock of knowledge, which is related to the capital stock    and the learning parame-
ter  >0 . The positive externality generated by the capital stock can be justified by 
the argument, that knowledge is embodied in the capital stock. For example, if some-
one wants to work with a computer, she needs a computer and has to invest time to 
learn how to use it. This argument is very close to the considerations of Paul M. Ro-
mer (1986, 1989) on positive externalities. As we see, the individual has to solve two 
problems, to maximize her utility. At first, the individual has to maximize her income 
by determining the optimal duration of educational and working time. This can be 
done separately, because the time allocation does not influence the intertemporal al-
location problem. Therefore, at first the individual maximizes her wage income by 
choosing the optimal   . Maximizing the RHS of (3) with respect to    leads imme-
diately to:  
 
  
∗ =
 
    =  ∗.    (5)
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Obviously, the optimal time allocation is independent of the period, the wage 
rate per effective labor unit, and the capital stock. It only depends on the learning 
parameter  .The second step of the individual is to determine the optimal intertem-
poral allocation of her wage income between current consumption and future con-
sumption. This problem can be solved by a Lagrangian approach, taking (1) and (2) 
into account:  
 
max  
 ,    
  ,  ℒ   
 ,     
  ,   =     
 ,     
    −      
  +
    
 
    
−    .  (6)
 
The resulting necessary conditions are given by the budget constraint (2) and 
the usual intertemporal optimality condition.   
 
     
 ,    
   
     
 ,    
    =1+     .  (7)
 
Using (2), (7) and the assumption that the utility function is homothetic, we 
can write the savings function in the following way: 
  
     ,       =s         .    (8)
 
Clearly, the average savings rate s       fulfills 1 ≥ s       ≥0 . We assume 
that 1≥
        
     
≥0 . This means that the interest elasticity of the savings is positive, 
which seems to be plausible, if we take the empirical results of Thorvaldur Gyl-
fason’s (1993) survey into account. Because of the homotheticity assumption, the 
savings are a linear function of the wage income.  
 Regarding the production side of the economy, we use a modified approach 
of Carlie Geerdink and Peter J. Stauvermann (2005, 2006). As they, we reject the 
idea that the factor prices are technically determined by the production function. In-
stead, we assume that wages and profits are a result of a labor dispute or collective 
bargaining. The outcome of a labor dispute depends on the institutional setting of the 
economy. For example, the government can introduce a minimum wage, labor laws, 
industrial laws, and other regulations. On the other hand, the capital owners can lock 
out workers, dismiss them and so forth. To formalize the idea, we use a modified 
conflict model of Jack Hirshleifer (1989) and Stergios Skaperdas (1996). To set up 
the model formally, we use a contest success function in the following bargaining 
process. The workers get the share  1−α   of the output and the capital owners re-
ceive the remaining share α. Following the definition of the System of National Ac-
counts 1995, the labor’s income share includes: wages, piece payments, salaries, tips, 
bonuses, fringe benefits, commissions, and employer’s contributions to social secu-
rity programs, pension schemes, health plans and other social benefit packages. 
The outcome of a labor dispute depends in general on the efforts of the work-
ers, efforts of the employers, the labor laws and union laws. Thus, the institutional 
setting of the labor market is decisive for the outcome of the dispute. The function 
    ,   ,   ,     =
     
           
 is a distribution function, which determines the in- 
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come share of the capital owners. The variables    and    represent the stakes or 
efforts of the workers and the capital owners (e.g. times of strike and times of lock-
out) to get a bigger share of the production Y. The capital owners maximize the capi-
tal income:  
 
       =     ,   ,   ,        −    =
     
           
    −   .  (9)
 
We assume that the depreciation rate of capital is zero. The workers maximize 
their aggregate wage income, where      =    ℎ   ∗  ∗   and    is the number of 
workers. 
 
     =  1−     ,   ,   ,         −    =
       
                 −   .  (10)
 
The variables    and    represent the institutional setting of labor disputes. 
The industrial laws (e.g. minimum wage, dismissal protection laws), labor laws and 
so on define the institutional setting, which is under the control of the government.  
If workers and capital owners maximize their incomes with respect to their ef-
forts    and    we get the following best response functions:  
 
   =−     +    +     +         +    ,  (11)
 
   =−     +    +     +         +    .  (12)
 
Solving this system, we get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the labor dispute:  
 
  
∗ =
   
  −    and    
∗ =
   
  −   .  (13)
 
To simplify the analysis, we assume without loss of generality that 
min   ,     ≥
   
  and that    and    grow with the same rate as the production. That 
means, that the outcome of the labor dispute depends only on the institutional ar-
rangement in the country, and  0   C L g g . Under these circumstances, the institu-
tional setting of the labor market is efficient, because nothing is lost in labor disputes. 
If  0  L g and/or  0  C g  hold, the labor dispute provokes additional costs, which 
can be interpreted as transaction costs. Given the assumption above, the distribution 
function simplifies to     ,     =
  
     
. This implies, the more left-wing the gov-
ernment is, the lower is the ratio   /   . If the government is more likely to be right-
wing or capital owner friendly, the opposite holds. The function     ,     has some 
nice properties, these are: (a) 
     ,    
   
=−
        ,     
   
 and 
     ,    
   
=
−
        ,     
   
, and (b) the shares add up to 1. Because of these characteristics, we 
write for simplicity       instead of     ,    . The first derivative is        <0 .  
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Here we analyze only effects caused by a change of labor laws. This is caused by the 
fact that increased labor rights laws means implicitly a reduction of the capital 
owner’s rights and the other way around.  
Now we come to the production function, which is a Leontief production func-
tion. The reason is that we reject the idea of the substitutability of input factors and 
especially the idea that capital is malleable, because, in reality, we observe that the 
scarcest input factor determines the production. Because of space restrictions, we 
cannot go into the details of the discussion and refer to Geerdink and Stauvermann 
(2005, 2006). The production function here allows never-ending endogenous growth, 
which is not the case in Geerdink and Stauvermann (2005, 2006). In the former mod-
els, a steady-state equilibrium results in the long run. In the modified model, the 
physical capital accumulation is the driver of growth, which also drives the human 
capital accumulation. In some sense, the model here is an advancement of the older 
model.  
The variable    represents the total amount of effective labor units. 
 
    =  min   ,     =  min   ,ℎ    ∗  ∗     (14)
 
Simplifying and using (4) gives: 
 
    =    min 1, 1−  ∗   ∗   .  (14’)
 
By using (5) the production is given by:  
 
    = 
   ,if1≤ 
 
    
   
     
     
 
    
   
     ,if1> 
 
    
   
     
.  (15)
 
The second sub-equation of (15) is irrelevant, if  
 
    
   
      ≥1   holds. The 
parameter   has to be sufficiently small and the population size sufficiently large. 
The lower   is the more effective is the learning technology. However, this feature 
does not exist in Romer (1986). In his model, growth occurs if there is only one hu-
man, and if the population grows, the resulting growth rate increases from period to 
period.   
In this model, the economy can be stuck in a low development trap, if the 
learning technology is sufficiently ineffective or if the population size is sufficiently 
small.  
To analyze the situation of developed countries, we assume that 
 
 
    
   
      >1  holds and that    =  1+    , where  ≥0 . In this case, we ob-
serve unemployment, because the physical capital stock is smaller than the human 
capital stock;    <    and hence the physical capital stock determines the produc-
tion. We can define the unemployment rate as     =
     
  
=1−
         
    
. Even 
that it would be interesting to analyze policy measures how to deal with this unem- 
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ployment; we assume for simplicity that the total working hours are distributed 
equally between all workers. Therefore, the total working hours of the economy de-
crease in the long run. Now we concentrate on the long-run development. The pro-
duction function (15) reduces to:  
 
    =    .  (16)
 
Now we can determine the wage income, capital income, savings, and growth 
rates. Using    =    =0 , and (16) in combination with (9) and (10), the factor 
prices are given by: 
 
   =    ℎ   ∗  ∗ =  1−        
  
  
    (17)
 
and,  
 
   =       .  (18)
 
Obviously, the workers distribute the aggregate wage incomes proportionally 
to the effective labor units. Consequently,     =
            
    ∗  ∗  
 holds. The factor prices 
are determined by the labor protection laws, labor laws, right to strike and compul-
sory contributions of the employers to the social security system or health insurance. 
If      =1, the interpretation would be that the capital owners would be expropri-
ated, if      =0, the employees would live like slaves. Using the savings function 
(8) and the wage rate (17), we can determine the savings per capita:  
 
   =         =           1 −        
  
  
.  (19)
 
Consequently, the aggregate savings are given by: 
 
   =           1 −          .  (20)
 
In a next step, we take the capital market clearing condition into account: 
 
          1 −           =     .  (21)
 
A reformulation gives the growth rate of the capital stock G:  
 
1+ =
    
  
=           1 −        .  (22)
 
It should be clear that all aggregate variables, except the population grow with 
the rate G. The per-capita variables grow with the rate  =
   
   . Additionally, given 
the per-capita savings, the equilibrium consumption of the young and old equals:  
  
80  Peter J. Stauvermann 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 1, pp. 73-87 
  
 ∗ =  1−            1 −        
  
  
    and 
  
 ∗ =  1+       
       
  
. 
(23)
 
To close the model, we analyze what happens regarding the growth rate if we 
change the institutional setting: 
 
  
  
=              1 −       −             (24)
 
The derivative is positive, if: 
 
          
  
  
          >
     
        ⟺   ,  >
 
   .  (25)
 
Proposition 1: An increase of the capital’s income share       raises the 
growth rate, if the elasticity of savings   ,  regarding to the interest rate exceeds the 
ratio between the capital’s income share and the labor’s income share. 
We cannot exclude that the condition of proposition 1 holds, if we look at the 
empirical results of Masao Ogaki, Jonathan Ostry, and Carmen M. Reinhart (1996), 
Reinhart and Jonathan D. Ostry (1995), and the data of OECD database 2009 on la-
bor’s shares. An increase of the growth rate caused by a redistribution from labor 
income to capital income is likely, if the country is relatively well developed, has a 
high labor’s income share and a low time preference rate. In such a case, the interest 
rate effect overcompensates the income effect of the redistribution from labor to 
capital income.  
If we take into account realistic values, then the elasticity   ,  is near zero or 
zero and the ratio of the labor’s income share to the capital’s income share is just 
around a half. In this case, the redistribution from labor income to capital income 
reduces the growth rate. Let us now determine the welfare effects of an increase of 
the capital’s income share. We get the equilibrium value of utility of an individual 
born in t, by substituting the values from (22) and (23) into (1) and using the homo-
theticity assumption.  
 
   =     1−        1−  , 1+           1−    
  
  
.  (26)
 
 Taking into account that the utility function is concave, the necessary and suf-
ficient condition for the optimal capital’s income share       is given by: 
 
     
 ∗,    
 ∗  
     
 ∗,    
 ∗   =
                  
     
               
     
                
.  (27)
 
Our assumptions guarantee that an optimal capital’s income share and an op-
timal    exist. However, this does not mean, that these optimal values can be real- 
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ized without harming any generation. In general, a representative indirect utility 
function of an individual has the form:    =        
   
    
 
,   . By substituting (17), 
(18) and (22) in it, we get:   
 
   =              1 −       
  
  
 
          1 −        
1+ 
 
 
,        .  (28)
 
Regarding the welfare analysis, the behavior of the growth factor plays the 
crucial role for all possible changes of parameters. Obviously, we can formulate the 
following lemma.  
Lemma: All policy measures, which lower the growth factor, lead to welfare 
loss of following generations.  
The proof is obvious, because the growth factor is exponentiated by t and if a 
policy measure affects the growth factor negatively, the relevant part in the deriva-
tive strives with an increasing number of periods against minus infinity, even if the 
policy measure can create welfare gains in the short run. With the help of the lemma, 
we state the following. 
Proposition 2: A decrease of the capital’s income share harms at least the liv-
ing old generation. A welfare increase in the sense of Pareto is impossible.  
Proposition 3: If    ,  >
 
    holds, a redistribution from labor income to capi-
tal income raises the welfare all generations.  
According to proposition 1, a redistribution from labor income to capital in-
come increases the growth rate and the interest rate, given the condition of proposi-
tion 3. Additionally the welfare of the living young generation increases, and also all 
other generations gain, because of either the higher interest rate and/ or higher 
growth rate. The problem is of course, that the condition is rarely fulfilled in reality. 
An extended formal proof of proposition 2 and 3 can be found in Stauvermann 
(1997).  
Until here, we only analyzed a closed economy. In the next section, we allow 
the international mobility of capital.  
 
2. A Small Open Economy 
 
Let us assume a small domestic economy and the opening of the capital market. We 
further assume that the world market interest rate is given by   , and that only new 
capital is mobile; that means only ∆  =      −    is mobile. The existing capital 
stock remains where it is. If the non-arbitrage condition    =   holds, where the 
domestic economy’s interest rate is  , nothing changes, because then the capital 
owners have no incentive to import or to export capital. However, now let us investi-
gate in the case where    >  . In this case, the domestic investors, represented by 
the workers at the end of the first period of life or their pension funds, have an incen-
tive to invest all savings abroad and therefore the domestic growth rate declines. Of 
course, the only possibility of the domestic government to avoid a decline of its  
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economy would be to change its redistributional policy. This is the only policy option 
to avoid the outflow of capital. An adjustment of the income distribution by lowering 
the social standards of workers and /or labor laws has an influence on the growth rate 
and welfare. If the government increases       to halt capital outflows, the interest 
rate must increase until    =   is fulfilled, and the domestic capital owners are bet-
ter off. At the same time the wage incomes decrease and as discussed above the con-
sequences for the living working class and following generations are unclear, as we 
know from proposition 2 and 3. Therefore, it depends on the distribution of income 
and elasticity of savings, if a welfare increase will result or not.  
The second relevant case is    <  ;  in this case the domestic economy real-
izes an inflow of capital, which increases the production and wage incomes and con-
sequently the growth rate. In so far, the domestic economy is better off as the conse-
quence.  
However, the domestic economy has to expect that the rest of the world will 
begin to change its institutional settings, so that the interest rate in the rest of the 
world increases. It seems to be a realistic conclusion, that a competition to the bottom 
of labor’s share will take place, to attract as much as possible capital from abroad. 
Therefore, worldwide capital owners are better off in the long and short run, and all 
growth rates except n decrease. We should note that it becomes more unlikely that 
the condition    ,  >
 
    holds, the higher the capital’s income share is.  
Proposition 4: If a race to the bottom of labor’s income share takes place to 
attract capital, in the long run the endogenous growth rates will decline, and all coun-
tries are worse off by opening the capital market.   
 
3. The Two Country Case 
  
Here we examine the case of two countries to work out the results of the latter sec-
tion more clearly. All variables of the foreign country are marked with an asterisk. 
Let us assume that both countries are identical, except for the institutional settings. 
Let us assume the following: 
 
    =     and 
   
∗ =    
∗ and 
  
∗ =    
(29)
 
   =  1−        
  
  
   and 
  
∗ =  1−  ∗   
∗   
  
∗
  
∗, 
(30)
   
where we assume that    =   
∗ and    >   
∗. Consequently,      <  ∗   
∗  and 
   >   
∗.  
 
   =        and 
  
∗ =  ∗   
∗  . 
Consequently,   
∗ >   . 
(31) 
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   =         and 
  
∗ =     
∗   
∗. 
(32)
 
1+ =          1 −        and 
1+  ∗ =  ∗  ∗   
∗    1 −  ∗   
∗   . 
(33)
 
1+ =
                   
     and 
 
1+  ∗ =
 ∗  ∗   
∗       ∗   
∗   
   ∗ , 
(34)
 
where we assume that  ∗ =  . Let us now assume that both countries open the capi-
tal market in period 0. Then in period 1 the equilibrium values are:  
 
   =    and 
 
  
∗ =  ∗  ∗   
∗    1 −  ∗   
∗     
∗ +          1 −           −
  
  
∗   . 
(35)
 
The domestic economy’s savings are invested in the existing domestic capital 
stock, and the rest of the savings are invested in the foreign country. But mind, the 
young generation is only willing to pay 
  
  
∗    consumption units in exchange for the 
existing capital stock    , where of course 
  
  
∗    <   . This is necessary to equalize 
the interest rates. Now we calculate the growth rates: 
 
   =0  and 
 
1+   
∗ =  ∗  ∗   
∗    1 −  ∗   
∗    +          1 −         −1 .  
(36)
 
The domestic economy is stagnating and the growth rate in the foreign country 
increases. Consequently, we can now calculate the wage incomes of both countries:  
 
   =  1−        
  
  
 and 
 
  
∗ =  1−  ∗   
∗   
     
∗   
∗
  
∗ . 
(37)
 
It is obvious that the capital intensity in the domestic economy decreases 
every period by    =−
 
    . The same holds for the wage income per capita. In the 
foreign country the capital intensity and wage income per capita grows with   
∗ =
  
∗  
   ∗, and    =    <   
∗ =   
∗. Because of the lower price of the existing capital 
stock in the domestic economy, the interest rates are internationally equalized. Then 
the savings function is given by:  
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   =     
∗  1 −            and 
 
  
∗ =     
∗  1 −  ∗   
∗    1+   
∗   
∗, 
(38)
 
and the production is given by: 
 
    =     and 
 
   
∗ =   1+   
∗   
∗. 
(39)
 
The consequences are clear now; the growth rate in the foreign country in-
creases, and in the long run it will converge against its original growth rate, because 
each period the additional capital inflow from the domestic country declines, caused 
by the economic stagnation in the domestic country. However, the foreign country 
gains in the short and long run, because of the capital inflow. The domestic economy 
loses in the short and long run, because the wage incomes and the per-capita produc-
tion decrease, and the unemployment rate increases. In the short run, the domestic 
capital owners lose, because of the devaluation of the existing capital stock. In the 
long run, the domestic workers will lose because of the lower capital stock and hence 
lower wage incomes.  
Proposition 5: The opening of the capital market harms all generations of the 
domestic economy if  <  ∗.  
As it is known from the earlier discussion, the only way to avoid the stagna-
tion or further economic decline is to impose capital controls or to change the institu-
tional setting of the labor market. However, lowering the labor share of income 
seems to be a good policy to attract capital from abroad and to increase the national 
income. Given this, it would be not surprising if a Bertrand competition between 
both countries with respect to labor laws takes place. At the end, it results in a race to 
the bottom, and the labor’s income share will decrease as much as possible. If we 
look at the data of the labor’s income share of the last 35 years (see, for example 
Malte Lubker 2007), we observe that with an increasing globalization, the share de-
creased dramatically after 1975 in developed countries, which had mostly high stan-
dards of labor laws and of social security systems. The problem is that a kind of un-
fair competition is taking place, where countries with no or low standards of labor 
laws compete with countries, which have high standards. We want to note; we do not 
take into question the results of Ricardo or Heckscher-Ohlin; they are of course right. 
However, they have assumed fair conditions of competition, which is not the case in 
the real world. How shall European workers compete against working children in 
India, which were sold to firm owners and are living in slavery?  
Proposition 6: The only way of guarantee the social standards in the domestic 
economy, is to introduce capital controls or to find an international agreement on 
labor and social standards.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
We introduced an endogenous growth model which is based on a Leontief production 
function, and it has the features as the AK-Model introduced by Sergio Rebelo 
(1991), but with a microeconomic foundation, where we used the framework of an 
OLG-model. A second difference to Rebelo’s AK model is that in our model, labor is 
essential and the difference to Romer’s (1986) model and others is that population 
growth does not lead to increasing per-capita growth rates. In our model, the institu-
tional setting of the labor market determines the distribution of income. We use this 
model to analyze the welfare effects of globalization by opening the capital market. 
Our results are not in favor of globalization, because some countries lose and some 
countries gain in the short run. If international competition leads to a rat race, where 
the country with the lowest social standards and worst labor laws is the scale to 
reach, worldwide the growth rates will decline, and all countries will be worse off in 
the long run. It seems to be that this theory is better able to explain the decline of the 
labor’s income share than standard neoclassical explanations. The general problem of 
globalization seems to be that a competition to the bottom with respect to the bar-
gaining power of labor unions and workers is taking place. Or, as Nicole Attia and 
Valerie Bérenger (2009, p. 17) stated with respect to the social convergence of the 
European Union “A common philosophy clearly appears: the Welfare State is reced-
ing, calling more and more upon market mechanisms.” The German chancellor An-
gela Merkel confirms this daily in her statements with respect to Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain. Additionally, it must be feared that this competition will lead to 
lower growth rates worldwide than otherwise. As long as there are no international 
agreements with respect to labor laws and minimum standards of social security sys-
tems, globalization and open markets harm many countries, hitting the least devel-
oped and those with poor labor laws the hardest. In countries with such competing 
situations, it is virtually difficult to address child labor issues. According to UNICEF 
(2011), an estimated 158 million children aged 5-14 are engaged in child labor, that 
is 1/6 of all children in the world. What we need internationally is an agreement on 
labor laws and labor conditions. Otherwise, the working class has to pay the price. 
Moreover, the price is partly very high; only in China every year thousands of miners 
are dying because of missing industrial safety regulations. According to the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (2006), in China died in 2003 130 times more miners 
per million tons of coal than in the USA, 250 times more than in Australia and 10 
times more than in Russia. 
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